Diversity, Not Randomness, Trumps Ability.
A number of formal models, including a highly influential model from Hong and Page, purport to show that functionally diverse groups often beat groups of individually high-performing agents in solving problems. Thompson argues that in Hong and Page's model, that the diverse groups are created by a r...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 86; no. 1; pp. 178 - 192 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Jan2019
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134147259&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134147259 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 86 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 134147259 10.1086/701074 ppf: 178 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Diversity, Not Randomness, Trumps Ability. aug: au: Singer, Daniel J. su: Cultural pluralism Ability Argument Causation (Philosophy) Philosophy sug: subj: Cultural pluralism Ability Argument Causation (Philosophy) Philosophy ab: A number of formal models, including a highly influential model from Hong and Page, purport to show that functionally diverse groups often beat groups of individually high-performing agents in solving problems. Thompson argues that in Hong and Page's model, that the diverse groups are created by a random process explains their success, not the diversity. Here, I defend the diversity interpretation of the Hong and Page result. The failure of Thompson's argument shows that to understand the value of functional diversity, we should be clearer about how we conceive of and measure that diversity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|