On Respecting Animals, or Can Animals be Wronged Without Being Harmed?
There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of privacy, ridiculing unaware individuals, or disregarding individuals' autonomous decision-making in their best inter...
| Publicado en: | Res Publica (13564765) Vol. 25; no. 1; pp. 83 - 100 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134171214&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134171214 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13564765 NMV jtl: Res Publica (13564765) issn: 13564765 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2019 vid: 25 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 134171214 10.1007/s11158-017-9379-9 ppf: 83 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 414KB tig: atl: On Respecting Animals, or Can Animals be Wronged Without Being Harmed? aug: au: Martin, Angela K. affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Avenue de l'Europe 20, 1700, Freiburg, Switzerland su: Animal welfare Decision making Ethics Public welfare policy Right of privacy sug: subj: Animal welfare Decision making Ethics Public welfare policy Right of privacy keyword: Animal ethics Discrimination Harm Humiliation Respect ab: There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of privacy, ridiculing unaware individuals, or disregarding individuals' autonomous decision-making in their best interest. However, it is less clear whether the same is true of animals—that is, whether moral agents can wrong animals in situations that do not involve any harm to the animals concerned. In order to answer this question, I concentrate on the illustrative case of treating animals in a demeaning yet harmless way that would be disrespectful if humans were concerned. I discuss whether such actions are permissible or unjustifiably discriminatory from a moral point of view. I conclude that moral agents cannot directly wrong animals without harming them and thus do not owe it to a particular animal to refrain from such actions. However, if the actions increase the likelihood that animal abuse will occur, this presents a strong indirect reason against performing them. Thus, the reasons for refraining from such actions are merely indirect rather than direct. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Res Publica (13564765) is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Res Publica (13564765) holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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