The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams.
The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requirin...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 196; no. 1; pp. 145 - 161 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134195742&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134195742 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 196 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 134195742 10.1007/s11229-016-1046-8 ppf: 145 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 425KB tig: atl: The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams. aug: au: Kane, Robert affil: Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas, 2210 Speedway C3500, 78712, Austin, TX, USA su: Free will & determinism Will Libertarians Objections (Evidence) Liberty sug: subj: Free will & determinism Will Libertarians Objections (Evidence) Liberty ab: The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requiring indeterminism in the light of modern science. This task involves, among other things, avoiding all traditional libertarian appeals to unusual forms of agency or causation (uncaused causes, noumenal selves, non-event agent causes, etc.) that cannot be accounted for by ordinary modes of explanation familiar to the natural and human sciences. Doing this, I argue, requires piecing together a "complex tapestry" of ideas and arguments that involve rethinking many traditional assumptions about free will. The paper also argues that one cannot get to the heart of historical debates about free will without distinguishing different kinds of freedom, different senses of will, and different notions of control, among other distinctions. I especially focus here on different notions of freedom and control that are necessary to make sense of free will. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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