Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties.

Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qual...

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Publicado en:Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 5; no. 35; pp. 1 - 20
Autor principal: Bauer, William A.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Paradigm Publishing Services 2013
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Bauer, William A.
        affil: North Carolina State University.
      su:
        Disposition (Philosophy)
        Essentialism (Philosophy)
        Sparse matrices
        Spacetime
        Quality
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          Disposition (Philosophy)
          Essentialism (Philosophy)
          Sparse matrices
          Spacetime
          Quality
      keyword:
        Dispositions
        Essentialism
        Powerful Qualities
        Powers
        Sparse Properties
      ab: Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers--explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between powers and space-time points, whether pure powers need to occupy space, and how to account for the movement of pure powers through space-time. Given Point Theory, dispositional essentialists should maintain that sparse properties are pure powers.
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    language: English
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