Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations.
Abstract The present paper addresses two policy objectives: to implement a market for pollution permits and to make regulation acceptable for businesses. Profit-neutral permit allocations are defined as the number of permits that the regulator should give for free so that post-regulation profits (i....
| Publicado en: | Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 93; pp. 239 - 254 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
Jan2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=134253112&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 134253112 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00950696 EEM jtl: Journal of Environmental Economics & Management issn: 00950696 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 93 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 134253112 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.12.001 ppf: 239 ppct: 15 formats: tig: atl: Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations. aug: au: Nicolaï, Jean-Philippe affil: ETH Zürich, Chair of Integrative Risk Management and Economics, Zürichbergstrasse, 18 8032, Zürich, Switzerland su: Business enterprises Neutrality International competition Emission control Demand function sug: subj: Business enterprises Neutrality International competition Emission control Demand function keyword: Cournot oligopoly EU-ETS Pollution permits Cournot oligopoly EU-ETS Pollution permits ab: Abstract The present paper addresses two policy objectives: to implement a market for pollution permits and to make regulation acceptable for businesses. Profit-neutral permit allocations are defined as the number of permits that the regulator should give for free so that post-regulation profits (i.e. a firm's profits in the products market plus the value of the allowances granted for free) are equal to pre-regulation profits. The proposed model is developed by assuming that firms use polluting technologies and compete "à la Cournot". The paper demonstrates that a low number of free allowances is sufficient to meet these two goals. Moreover, the regulator can fully offset losses, even when the reduction in emissions is high, provided that the sectors concerned are not monopolies, both for isoelastic and linear demand functions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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