Ramsey, 'Universals' and atomic propositions.
In 'Universals' (1925), Ramsey declares that we do not, and cannot, know the forms of atomic propositions. A year later, in a symposium with Braithwaite and Joseph, he announces a change of mind: atomic propositions may, after all, be discoverable by analysis. It is clear from the 1926 paper that Ra...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 27; no. 1; pp. 134 - 155 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jan2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134473140&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134473140 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 27 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 134473140 10.1080/09608788.2018.1477731 ppf: 134 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: Ramsey, 'Universals' and atomic propositions. aug: au: Methven, S. J. affil: Worcester College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK su: Atomism Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Book : Wittgenstein) Ramsey, Frank Negation (Logic) sug: subj: Atomism Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Book : Wittgenstein) Ramsey, Frank Negation (Logic) keyword: logical atomism quantification Ramsey Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus truth Wittgenstein ab: In 'Universals' (1925), Ramsey declares that we do not, and cannot, know the forms of atomic propositions. A year later, in a symposium with Braithwaite and Joseph, he announces a change of mind: atomic propositions may, after all, be discoverable by analysis. It is clear from the 1926 paper that Ramsey intends this to be a revision of the 1925 claim. Puzzlingly, however, Ramsey does not mention analysis in 1925. My task in this article is to provide a justification for that change of mind. My argument consists of two parts. I first show what relation holds between the negative 1925 assertion and the more positive 1926 assertion which allows us to read the latter claim as a retraction of the former, as Ramsey appears to have intended it. Then I shall argue that the retraction of the 1925 claim is forced upon Ramsey by reflection on the fact that three theses, all of which he held in or around the relevant period, are, rather surprisingly, revealed to be inconsistent. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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