Rethinking naive realism.
Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependent—their phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational prope...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 176; no. 3; pp. 607 - 634 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134561886&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134561886 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2019 vid: 176 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 134561886 10.1007/s11098-018-1030-x ppf: 607 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 534KB tig: atl: Rethinking naive realism. aug: au: Beck, Ori affil: Christ's College, University of Cambridge, St. Andrews Street, CB2 3BU, Cambridge, UK su: Sensory perception Phenomenology Realism Theory of knowledge Ideology sug: subj: Sensory perception Phenomenology Realism Theory of knowledge Ideology keyword: Disjunctivism Naive realism Neuro-computational properties Perception Phenomenal character ab: Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependent—their phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational properties of the subject. A good theory of perception must account for both these facts. But naive realism has been criticized for failing to accommodate internal-dependence. This paper evaluates and responds to this criticism. It first argues that a certain version of naive realism, often called "selectionism", does indeed struggle with internal-dependence. It then develops an alternate version of naive realism which does not. This alternate version, inspired by an idea of Martin's, accommodates the internal-dependence of perceptions by recognizing the role that the subject's neuro-computational properties play in shaping perceptual phenomenology. At the same time, it retains the distinctive naive realist account of the external-directedness of perceptions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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