Doing, Allowing, Gains, and Losses.
This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to framing effects in the famous "Asian flu" case. It argues that, alongside with their "loss/no gain effect" account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empirical data, amounts to a mor...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 21; no. 5; pp. 1107 - 1119 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134564811&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134564811 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2018 vid: 21 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 134564811 10.1007/s10677-018-9949-8 ppf: 1107 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 407KB tig: atl: Doing, Allowing, Gains, and Losses. aug: au: Colombo, Camilla affil: London School of Economics, London, UK su: Frames (Social sciences) Reductionism Prospect theory Ethics Influenza sug: subj: Frames (Social sciences) Reductionism Prospect theory Ethics Influenza keyword: Doing and allowing Endowment effect Loss/no gain effect ab: This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to framing effects in the famous "Asian flu" case. It argues that, alongside with their "loss/no gain effect" account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empirical data, amounts to a more reasonable psychological explanation for the preference reversal. Specifically, my hypothesis is that shifts in the baseline induce shifts in the agents' classification of the same action as "doing harm" rather than "allowing harm to occur", and that people are risk-seeking when it comes to avoid causing extra deaths-doing harm-and risk-averse when it comes to preventing more deaths-by the means of allowing other deaths to occur as a side effect. I then survey the two most influential concurrent accounts in the moral literature, with respect to the relation between the loss/no gain and the doing/allowing distinction: Horowitz's reductionist conclusion, which argues that the latter collapses into the former, and Kamm's rebuttal, which claims instead that the two distinctions can be pulled apart. I eventually explain why my interpretation differs from both these positions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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