Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience.
This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 84; no. 1; pp. 1 - 20 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134610493&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134610493 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2019 vid: 84 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 134610493 10.1007/s10670-017-9944-9 ppf: 1 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 473KB tig: atl: Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience. aug: au: Dziurosz-Serafinowicz, Patryk affil: Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdansk, Gdansk, Poland su: Supervenience (Philosophy) Psychological resilience Probability theory Numerical analysis X-ray diffraction sug: subj: Supervenience (Philosophy) Psychological resilience Probability theory Numerical analysis X-ray diffraction ab: This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance of A. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition A to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of A. I first introduce, motivate, and make precise a resiliency-centered approach to chance whose basic idea is that any chance distribution should be maximally invariant under variation of experimental factors. Second, I show that any present chance distribution that violates the two conditions can be replaced by another present chance distribution that satisfies them and is more resilient under variation of experimental factors. This shows that the two conditions are an essential feature of chances that maximize resiliency. Finally, I explore the relationship between the idea of resilient chances so understood and so-called Humean accounts of chance—one of the most promising recent philosophical accounts of chance. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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