Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium.

I analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms. Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take noncontractible actions for which rewards must be informally promised rather than contractually assured. The credibility of such promises o...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 121 - 147
Autor principal: Powell, Michael
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Spring2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium.
      aug:
        au: Powell, Michael
        affil: Northwestern University
      su:
        Production (Economic theory)
        Business enterprises
        Persons
        Equilibrium
        Rent charges (Feudal law)
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        subj:
          Production (Economic theory)
          Business enterprises
          Persons
          Equilibrium
          Rent charges (Feudal law)
      ab: I analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms. Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take noncontractible actions for which rewards must be informally promised rather than contractually assured. The credibility of such promises originates from a firm's future competitive rents. In equilibrium, heterogeneous firms are heterogeneously constrained, and competitive rents are inefficiently concentrated at the top. I explore several policy and empirical implications of this result.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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