Patent pools, vertical integration, and downstream competition.
Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 168 - 201 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=134665226&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 134665226 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2019 vid: 50 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 134665226 10.1111/1756-2171.12266 ppf: 168 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 344KB tig: atl: Patent pools, vertical integration, and downstream competition. aug: au: Reisinger, Markus Tarantino, Emanuele affil: Frankfurt School of Finance & Management University of Mannheim and CEPR su: Tariff Patents License agreements Manufactured products Pricing sug: subj: Tariff Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works) All Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing All other miscellaneous manufacturing Offices of Lawyers All Other Legal Services Other federal government public administration Patents License agreements Manufactured products Pricing ab: Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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