Demand for health insurance: Evidence from the California and Washington ACA exchanges.
I estimate demand for health insurance using consumer-level data from the California and Washington ACA exchanges. I use the demand estimates to simulate the impact of policies targeting adverse selection, including subsidies and the individual mandate. I find (1) own-premium elasticities of -7.2 to...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Health Economics Vol. 63; pp. 197 - 223 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier B.V.
Jan2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ccm&AN=134796972&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ccm uiTerm: 134796972 longDbName: CINAHL Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: dissinfo: jinfo: jid: 01676296 JOH jtl: Journal of Health Economics issn: 01676296 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 63 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier B.V. artinfo: ui: 134796972 134796972 NLM30590284 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.11.004 NLM30590284 134796972 ppf: 197 ppct: 26 formats: tig: atl: Demand for health insurance: Evidence from the California and Washington ACA exchanges. aug: au: Saltzman, Evan affil: Department of Economics, Emory University, 1602 Fishburne Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, United States sug: subj: Health Insurance Exchanges Statistics and Numerical Data Health Services Needs and Demand Statistics and Numerical Data Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Administration Insurance, Health Statistics and Numerical Data Infant Female Infant, Newborn Child Washington Child, Preschool Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Statistics and Numerical Data California Male Young Adult Adolescence Adult Middle Age Clinical Assessment Tools Impact of Events Scale Infant: 1-23 months Infant, Newborn: birth-1 month Child: 6-12 years Child, Preschool: 2-5 years Adolescent: 13-18 years Adult: 19-44 years Middle Aged: 45-64 years Female Male ab: I estimate demand for health insurance using consumer-level data from the California and Washington ACA exchanges. I use the demand estimates to simulate the impact of policies targeting adverse selection, including subsidies and the individual mandate. I find (1) own-premium elasticities of -7.2 to -10.6 and insurance coverage elasticities of -1.1 to -1.2; (2) limited response to the mandate penalty amount, but significant response to the penalty's existence, suggesting consumers have a "taste for compliance"; (3) mandate repeal slightly increases consumer surplus because the ACA's price-linked subsidies shield most consumers from premium increases resulting from repeal and some consumers are not compelled to purchase insurance against their will; and (4) mandate repeal decreases consumer surplus if ACA subsidies are replaced with vouchers that expose consumers to premium increases. The economic rationale for the mandate depends on the extent of adverse selection and the presence of other policies targeting selection. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Journal Article ougenre: Article language: English refInfo: holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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