Nominalism, realism and objectivity.
I argue that constructive nominalism is preferable to scientific realism. Rather than reflecting without distortion the way the mind-independent world is, theories refract. They provide an understanding of the world as modulated by a particular theory. Truth is defined within a theoretical framework...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 196; no. 2; pp. 519 - 535 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I argue that constructive nominalism is preferable to scientific realism. Rather than reflecting without distortion the way the mind-independent world is, theories refract. They provide an understanding of the world as modulated by a particular theory. Truth is defined within a theoretical framework rather than outside of it. This does not undermine objectivity, for an assertion contains a (perhaps tacit) reference to the framework in terms of which its truth is claimed. |
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