Individuating quantities.

When discrepancies are discovered between the outcomes of different measurement procedures, two sorts of explanation are open to scientists. Either (i) some of the outcomes are inaccurate or (ii) the procedures are not measuring the same quantity. I argue that, due to the possibility of systematic e...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 176; no. 4; pp. 853 - 879
Autor principal: Tal, Eran
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Individuating quantities.
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        au: Tal, Eran
        affil: Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Leacock Building, 855 Sherbrooke St. West, H3A 2T7, Montreal, QC, Canada
      su:
        Scientists
        Measurement errors
        Individuation (Philosophy)
        Philosophy
        Entity (Philosophy)
        Contingency (Philosophy)
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          Scientists
          Measurement errors
          Individuation (Philosophy)
          Philosophy
          Entity (Philosophy)
          Contingency (Philosophy)
      keyword:
        Idealization
        Measurement
        Models
        Quantity
        Systematic error
        Underdetermination
      ab: When discrepancies are discovered between the outcomes of different measurement procedures, two sorts of explanation are open to scientists. Either (i) some of the outcomes are inaccurate or (ii) the procedures are not measuring the same quantity. I argue that, due to the possibility of systematic error, the choice between (i) and (ii) is underdetermined in principle by any possible evidence. Consequently, foundationalist criteria of quantity individuation are either empty or circular. I propose a coherentist, model-based account of measurement that avoids the underdetermination problem, and use this account to explain how scientists individuate quantities in practice.
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