Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.
Sometimes a proposition is 'opaque' to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 98; no. 2; pp. 375 - 392 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=135497283&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 135497283 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2019 vid: 98 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 135497283 10.1111/phpr.12452 ppf: 375 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 134KB tig: atl: Basic‐Know And Super‐Know. aug: au: Mahtani, Anna affil: London School of Economics and Political Science su: Proposition (Logic) Counterfactuals (Logic) Critical thinking Value proposition Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Proposition (Logic) Counterfactuals (Logic) Critical thinking Value proposition Theory of knowledge ab: Sometimes a proposition is 'opaque' to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the 'Opaque Proposition Principle'. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term 'know' as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic‐know or super‐know. I use this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then to similarly construct plausible versions of the Reflection Principle and the Sure‐Thing Principle. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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