The intentionality and intelligibility of moods.
This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective–evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non‐intentional, and so also arational. Section 2 provides a conce...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27; no. 1; pp. 118 - 136 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=135597531&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 135597531 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2019 vid: 27 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 135597531 10.1111/ejop.12385 ppf: 118 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 872KB tig: atl: The intentionality and intelligibility of moods. aug: au: Mitchell, Jonathan affil: Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry UK su: Intentionality (Philosophy) Intelligibility of speech Mood (Psychology) Theory of knowledge Social context sug: subj: Intentionality (Philosophy) Intelligibility of speech Mood (Psychology) Theory of knowledge Social context ab: This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective–evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non‐intentional, and so also arational. Section 2 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 3 argues moods target the subject's total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood‐Intentionality thesis). Section 4 argues some moods are experienced as rationally intelligible responses, and so epistemically appropriate, to the way "the world" presents itself (the Mood‐Intelligibility thesis). Finally, Section 5 discusses the epistemology of moods. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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