Subject and Subjectivity in Hobbes and Leibniz: Cosmology and Artifice.
This paper seeks to examine two moments of the subject's identification with substance in modernity, namely, the body in Hobbesian philosophy and the individual substance in Leibnizian thought. In Hobbes, to be a subject signifies to be subjected (to imaginary space, to the movements transmitted by...
| Publicado en: | Hobbes Studies Vol. 32; no. 1; pp. 5 - 22 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=135630003&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 135630003 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09215891 5D7Q jtl: Hobbes Studies issn: 09215891 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: 2019 vid: 32 iid: 1 pid: 639 pub: Brill Academic Publishers artinfo: ui: 135630003 10.1163/18750257-03201005 ppf: 5 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 187KB tig: atl: Subject and Subjectivity in Hobbes and Leibniz: Cosmology and Artifice. aug: au: Hirata, Celi affil: Universidade Federal de São Carlos, Brazil su: Subjectivity Substance (Philosophy) Political philosophy sug: subj: Subjectivity Substance (Philosophy) Political philosophy keyword: activity subject subjectivity substance will ab: This paper seeks to examine two moments of the subject's identification with substance in modernity, namely, the body in Hobbesian philosophy and the individual substance in Leibnizian thought. In Hobbes, to be a subject signifies to be subjected (to imaginary space, to the movements transmitted by means of shock, as well as to the sovereign), so that the body-substance is characterized by not having in itself its principle of movement. In Leibniz, for his turn, a subject (understood as substance) is that which contains in its own nature everything that can be truly predicated about it, implying that it is the foundation and principle of its own activity, or, in a word, it is self-sufficient. Nonetheless, although Hobbesian body is characterized by its inertia and Leibnizian substance by its self-sufficiency, it is my purpose to indicate that the former is more crucial than the latter to the constitution of the modern conception of subjectivity, i.e., of the subject as the center of action and as a founding power, capable of establishing a new order by its decision. This is not possible in Leibnizian philosophy, for, according to it, human activity, like that of any other substance, consists solely in the actualization of the divine plan of the best of all possible worlds. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Hobbes Studies is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Hobbes Studies holder: Brill Academic Publishers dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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