The imprecise impermissivist's dilemma.
Impermissivists hold that an agent with a given body of evidence has at most one rationally permitted attitude that she should adopt towards any particular proposition. Permissivists deny this, often motivating permissivism by describing scenarios that pump our intuitions that the agent could reason...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 196; no. 4; pp. 1623 - 1641 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2019
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=135662064&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 135662064 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2019 vid: 196 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 135662064 10.1007/s11229-017-1530-9 ppf: 1623 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 441KB tig: atl: The imprecise impermissivist's dilemma. aug: au: Castro, Clinton Hart, Casey affil: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA su: Uniqueness (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) Permissiveness Probabilism sug: subj: Uniqueness (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) Permissiveness Probabilism keyword: Bayesianism Permissivism Ranged credence Uniqueness ab: Impermissivists hold that an agent with a given body of evidence has at most one rationally permitted attitude that she should adopt towards any particular proposition. Permissivists deny this, often motivating permissivism by describing scenarios that pump our intuitions that the agent could reasonably take one of several attitudes toward some proposition. We criticize the following impermissivist response: while it seems like any of that range of attitudes is permissible, what is actually required is the single broad attitude that encompasses all of these single attitudes. While this might seem like an easy way to win over permissivists, we argue that this impermissivist response leads to an indefensible epistemology; permissive intuitions are not so easily co-opted. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|