Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence.
Summary: We experimentally explore the connections between horizontal conflict of interests (citizens have heterogeneous preferences over collective decisions) and vertical conflict of interests (agents in charge of implementing collective decisions earn political rents). We identify two sets of mod...
| Published in: | Kyklos Vol. 72; no. 2; pp. 239 - 270 |
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
May2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=135709879&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 135709879 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00235962 KYK jtl: Kyklos issn: 00235962 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2019 vid: 72 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 135709879 10.1111/kykl.12201 ppf: 239 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 175KB tig: atl: Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence. aug: au: Galiani, Sebastian Long, Cheryl Navajas Ahumada, Camila Torrens, Gustavo su: Resource allocation Equality Corruption Conflict of interests Endowments sug: subj: Resource allocation Equality Corruption Grantmaking Foundations Conflict of interests Endowments ab: Summary: We experimentally explore the connections between horizontal conflict of interests (citizens have heterogeneous preferences over collective decisions) and vertical conflict of interests (agents in charge of implementing collective decisions earn political rents). We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common‐agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents. Our findings have important implications. At the macro level, they help explaining the persistence of corruption in very unequal societies. At the micro level, our findings suggest that anti‐corruption programs should allocate more resources (e.g., inspectors and auditors) to areas with intense horizontal conflicts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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