Modal Objectivity1.
It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non‐rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It cou...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 53; no. 2; pp. 266 - 296 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=135934501&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 135934501 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2019 vid: 53 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 135934501 10.1111/nous.12205 ppf: 266 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 230KB tig: atl: Modal Objectivity1. aug: au: Clarke‐Doane, Justin affil: Columbia University su: Intelligibility of speech Metaphysics Mathematical analysis Set theory Motivation (Psychology) sug: subj: Intelligibility of speech Metaphysics Mathematical analysis Set theory Motivation (Psychology) ab: It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non‐rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real (non‐epistemic, non‐deontic) notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise "uniquely metaphysically significant" about metaphysical necessity, then paradigmatic metaphysical necessities would be necessary in one sense of "necessary", not necessary in another, and that would be it. The question of whether they were necessary simpliciter would be like the question of whether the Parallel Postulate is true simpliciter – understood as a pure mathematical conjecture, rather than as a hypothesis about physical spacetime. In a sense, the latter question has no objective answer. In this article, I argue that paradigmatic questions of modal metaphysics are like the Parallel Postulate question. I then discuss the deflationary ramifications of this argument. I conclude with an alternative conception of the space of possibility. According to this conception, there is no objective boundary between possibility and impossibility. Along the way, I sketch an analogy between modal metaphysics and set theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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