Pretrial negotiations under optimism.

We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of info...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 359 - 391
Autores principales: Vasserman, Shoshana, Yildiz, Muhamet
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Summer2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      tig:
        atl: Pretrial negotiations under optimism.
      aug:
        au:
          Vasserman, Shoshana
          Yildiz, Muhamet
        affil:
          Harvard University
          Massachusetts Institute of Technology
      su:
        Legal settlement
        Trials (Law)
        Legal judgments
        Pre-trial procedure
        Contract negotiations
      sug:
        subj:
          Legal settlement
          Trials (Law)
          Legal judgments
          Pre-trial procedure
          Contract negotiations
      ab: We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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