Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery.
De Finetti would claim that we can make sense of a draw in which each positive integer has equal probability of winning. This requires a uniform probability distribution over the natural numbers, violating countable additivity. Countable additivity thus appears not to be a fundamental constraint on...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 55; no. 2; pp. 301 - 322 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
University of Chicago Press
Jun2004
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=13614874&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 13614874 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00070882 BPL jtl: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science issn: 00070882 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2004 vid: 55 iid: 2 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 13614874 10.1093/bjps/55.2.301 ppf: 301 ppct: 21 formats: tig: atl: Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery. aug: au: Bartha, Paul affil: Department of Philosophy, 1866 Main Mall, E-370, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z1 Canada su: Probability theory Distribution (Probability theory) Lotteries Calculus Integer programming Philosophy of science sug: subj: Probability theory Distribution (Probability theory) Lotteries Calculus Integer programming Philosophy of science ab: De Finetti would claim that we can make sense of a draw in which each positive integer has equal probability of winning. This requires a uniform probability distribution over the natural numbers, violating countable additivity. Countable additivity thus appears not to be a fundamental constraint on subjective probability. It does, however, seem mandated by Dutch Book arguments similar to those that support the other axioms of the probability calculus as compulsory for subjective interpretations. These two lines of reasoning can be reconciled through a slight generalization of the Dutch Book framework. Countable additivity may indeed be abandoned for de Finetti's lottery, but this poses no serious threat to its adoption in most applications of subjective probability. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2004 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|