Putnam's Diagonal Argument and the Impossibility of a Universal Learning Machine.

Putnam construed the aim of Carnap's program of inductive logic as the specification of a "universal learning machine," and presented a diagonal proof against the very possibility of such a thing. Yet the ideas of Solomonoff and Levin lead to a mathematical foundation of precisely those aspects of C...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 84; no. 3; pp. 633 - 657
Autor principal: Sterkenburg, Tom F.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=136187067&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 136187067
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2019
      vid: 84
      iid: 3
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        136187067
        10.1007/s10670-018-9975-x
      ppf: 633
      ppct: 24
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 503KB
      tig:
        atl: Putnam's Diagonal Argument and the Impossibility of a Universal Learning Machine.
      aug:
        au: Sterkenburg, Tom F.
        affil: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, Munich, Germany
      su:
        Argument
        Machine learning
        Impossibility (Philosophy)
        Induction (Logic)
        Mathematics
      sug:
        subj:
          Argument
          Machine learning
          Impossibility (Philosophy)
          Induction (Logic)
          Mathematics
      ab: Putnam construed the aim of Carnap's program of inductive logic as the specification of a "universal learning machine," and presented a diagonal proof against the very possibility of such a thing. Yet the ideas of Solomonoff and Levin lead to a mathematical foundation of precisely those aspects of Carnap's program that Putnam took issue with, and in particular, resurrect the notion of a universal mechanical rule for induction. In this paper, I take up the question whether the Solomonoff–Levin proposal is successful in this respect. I expose the general strategy to evade Putnam's argument, leading to a broader discussion of the outer limits of mechanized induction. I argue that this strategy ultimately still succumbs to diagonalization, reinforcing Putnam's impossibility claim.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2019
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N