How Democracy Can Inform Consent: Cases of the Internet and Bioethics.
Traditional conceptions of informed consent seem difficult or even impossible to apply to new technologies like biobanks, big data, or GMOs, where vast numbers of people are potentially affected, and where consequences and risks are indeterminate or even unforeseeable. Likewise, the principle has co...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 36; no. 2; pp. 173 - 192 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=136381139&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 136381139 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2019 vid: 36 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 136381139 10.1111/japp.12360 ppf: 173 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 124KB tig: atl: How Democracy Can Inform Consent: Cases of the Internet and Bioethics. aug: au: Gould, Carol C. affil: Hunter College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, USA su: Bioethics Informed consent (Medical law) Human rights Democracy Privacy sug: subj: Bioethics Informed consent (Medical law) Human rights Democracy Privacy ab: Traditional conceptions of informed consent seem difficult or even impossible to apply to new technologies like biobanks, big data, or GMOs, where vast numbers of people are potentially affected, and where consequences and risks are indeterminate or even unforeseeable. Likewise, the principle has come under strain with the appropriation and monetisation of personal information on digital platforms. Over time, it has largely been reduced to bare assent to formalistic legal agreements. To address the current ineffectiveness of the norm of informed consent, I suggest that we need a notion of structural injustice (on a distinctive interpretation, elaborated here, which takes account of unequal power and property relations). I then argue that in order to protect and enhance people's freedom, we have to go beyond traditional applied ethics and introduce perspectives from democratic theory and social philosophy. I attempt to show how applications of the 'all‐affected principle', together with new forms of democratic participation, deliberation, and representation can helpfully frame the narrower principle of informed consent. There is an important role for what we could call collective consent, and informed consent can only succeed in increasing individual agency if it is situated within enhanced forms of democratic decision‐making. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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