Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition.
Silencing is a practice that disrupts linguistic and communicative acts, but its relationship to knowledge and justice is not fully understood. Prior models of epistemic injustice tend to characterize silencing as a symptom that follows as a result of underrepresenting the knowledge of others. In th...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 97; no. 2; pp. 294 - 309 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=136440518&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 136440518 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2019 vid: 97 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 136440518 10.1080/00048402.2018.1459754 ppf: 294 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 677KB tig: atl: Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. aug: au: Buckwalter, Wesley affil: University of Pittsburgh su: Epistemics Social perception Justice (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Cognitive science sug: subj: Epistemics Social perception Justice (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Cognitive science keyword: assertion knowledge mental states norms silencing speech acts ab: Silencing is a practice that disrupts linguistic and communicative acts, but its relationship to knowledge and justice is not fully understood. Prior models of epistemic injustice tend to characterize silencing as a symptom that follows as a result of underrepresenting the knowledge of others. In this paper, I advance a model of epistemic injustice in which the opposite sometimes happens. Drawing on recent work in experimental cognitive science, I argue that silencing can cause misrepresentations of knowledge and, subsequently, epistemic injustice to occur. Drawing on recent work in epistemology, I also argue that, according to some leading theories, silencing potentially causes ignorance by depriving individuals and communities of knowledge itself. These findings expand our understanding of silencing in social practice, contribute a broader model of epistemic injustice for research at the intersection of ethics and philosophy of mind, and have implications for leading theories of knowledge in epistemology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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