LEFT FOR DEAD: ANTI‐COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR IN ORBITAL SPACE.
In a dynamic investment framework with depreciation, we show incumbent satellite operators have incentives to "warehouse" a fraction of their assigned spectrum and orbital slots, keeping nonoperational assets in place, which reduces output, increases prices, and diminishes social welfare. Exploring...
| Published in: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 57; no. 3; pp. 1497 - 1510 |
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=136579409&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 136579409 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2019 vid: 57 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 136579409 10.1111/ecin.12790 ppf: 1497 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 263KB tig: atl: LEFT FOR DEAD: ANTI‐COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR IN ORBITAL SPACE. aug: au: Adilov, Nodir Cunningham, Brendan M. Alexander, Peter J. Duvall, Jerry Shiman, Daniel R. affil: Professor of Economics, Economics and Finance, Purdue University Fort Wayne, Fort Wayne IN 46814 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Eastern Connecticut State University, Willimantic CT 06226 Senior Economist/Researcher, Federal Communications Commission, Washington DC 20554 Industry Economist, Federal Communications Commission, Washington DC 20554 su: Investments Public welfare Warehouses Price increases Direct costing sug: subj: Investments Public welfare Miscellaneous Financial Investment Activities Investment Advice Health and Welfare Funds Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs) Emergency and Other Relief Services Other Individual and Family Services Commercial and Institutional Building Construction General Warehousing and Storage Other Warehousing and Storage Warehouses Price increases Direct costing ab: In a dynamic investment framework with depreciation, we show incumbent satellite operators have incentives to "warehouse" a fraction of their assigned spectrum and orbital slots, keeping nonoperational assets in place, which reduces output, increases prices, and diminishes social welfare. Exploring three distinct market structures, we model firms' incentives to warehouse, and show conditions under which firms choose to warehouse rather than replace nonfunctioning satellites. We find a dominant firm with a competitive fringe produces more and longer duration warehousing relative to perfect competition or monopoly. Regulators could remediate warehousing by increasing a firm's marginal costs, or by increasing the probability of reallocating orbital slots that do not have a fully functioning satellite. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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