We are All Bayesian, Everyone is Not a Bayesian.
Medical research makes intensive use of statistics in order to support its claims. In this paper we make explicit an epistemological tension between the conduct of clinical trials and their interpretation: statistical evidence is sometimes discarded on the basis of an (often) underlined Bayesian rea...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 38; no. 2; pp. 477 - 486 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jun2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=136648686&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 136648686 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2019 vid: 38 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 136648686 10.1007/s11245-018-9554-4 ppf: 477 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1000KB tig: atl: We are All Bayesian, Everyone is Not a Bayesian. aug: au: Andreoletti, Mattia Oldofredi, Andrea affil: Department of Experimental Oncology, European Institute of Oncology, Milan, Italy Department of Philosophy, Université de Lausanne, 1015, Chamberonne, Lausanne, Switzerland su: Clinical medicine Bayesian analysis Medical research Probability theory Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Clinical medicine Bayesian analysis Medical research Probability theory Theory of knowledge keyword: Bayesian statistics Clinical trials Evidence Frequentism Reference analysis Scientific inference ab: Medical research makes intensive use of statistics in order to support its claims. In this paper we make explicit an epistemological tension between the conduct of clinical trials and their interpretation: statistical evidence is sometimes discarded on the basis of an (often) underlined Bayesian reasoning. We suggest that acknowledging the potentiality of Bayesian statistics might contribute to clarify and improve comprehension of medical research. Nevertheless, despite Bayesianism may provide a better account for scientific inference with respect to the standard frequentist approach, Bayesian statistics is rarely adopted in clinical research. The main reason lies in the supposed subjective elements characterizing this perspective. Hence, we discuss this objection presenting the so-called Reference analysis, a formal method which has been developed in the context of objective Bayesian statistics in order to define priors which have a minimal or null impact on posterior probabilities. Furthermore, according to this method only available data are relevant sources of information, so that it resists the most common criticisms against Bayesianism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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