Emotional Justification.
Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences....
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 98; no. 3; pp. 541 - 567 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=136730797&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 136730797 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2019 vid: 98 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 136730797 10.1111/phpr.12453 ppf: 541 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 182KB tig: atl: Emotional Justification. aug: au: Echeverri, Santiago affil: University of Geneva su: Emotions Research Theory of knowledge Cognitive ability Skepticism sug: subj: Emotions Research Theory of knowledge Cognitive ability Skepticism ab: Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the 'simple view' of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the 'gap problem': If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non‐basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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