Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.
A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision‐making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call "Classical Inferentialism", holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 98; no. 3; pp. 697 - 725 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=136730798&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 136730798 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2019 vid: 98 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 136730798 10.1111/phpr.12455 ppf: 697 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 278KB tig: atl: Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds. aug: au: Buckner, Cameron affil: University of Houston su: Empirical research Cognition Sensitivity analysis Animal psychology Psychology Infants sug: subj: Empirical research Cognition Sensitivity analysis Animal psychology Psychology Infants ab: A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision‐making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call "Classical Inferentialism", holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the Davidsonian idea that practical inferences are at bottom categorization judgments. From this perspective, we can see how similarity‐based categorization processes widely studied in human and animal psychology might count as practically rational. The solution involves a novel hybrid of internalism and externalism: intuitive inferences are psychologically rational (in the explanatory sense) given the intensional sensitivity of the similarity assessment to the internal structure of the agent's reasons for acting, but epistemically rational (in the justificatory sense) given an ecological fit between the features matched by that assessment and the structure of the agent's environment. The essay concludes by exploring empirical results that show how nonlinguistic agents can be sensitive to these similarity assessments in a way that grants them control over their opaque judgments. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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