Stochastic Stability and Disagreements between Dynamics.

The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. The models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge....

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 86; no. 3; pp. 497 - 522
Autor principal: Mohseni, Aydin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jul2019
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Stochastic Stability and Disagreements between Dynamics.
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        au: Mohseni, Aydin
      su:
        Stochastic analysis
        Game theory
        Evolutionary theories
        Stochastic models
        Evolutionary models
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        subj:
          Stochastic analysis
          Game theory
          Evolutionary theories
          Stochastic models
          Evolutionary models
      ab: The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. The models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge. I demonstrate that the divergence between their predictions is a function of standard techniques used in their analysis and of differences in the idealizations involved in each. My analysis reveals problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class of games, demonstrates a novel domain of agreement between the dynamics, and indicates a broader moral for evolutionary modeling.
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    language: English
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