John Searle's Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism.
The article discusses the relationship between John Searle's doctrine of naturalism and various forms of materialism and dualism. It is argued that despite Searle's protestations, his doctrine is not substantially different from the epiphenomenalistic property dualism, except for the admission, in h...
| Publicado en: | Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 11; no. 52; pp. 23 - 45 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Paradigm Publishing Services
May2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=137273221&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 137273221 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0873626X 1CM2 jtl: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy issn: 0873626X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2019 vid: 11 iid: 52 pid: 35924 pub: Paradigm Publishing Services artinfo: ui: 137273221 10.2478/disp-2019-0003 ppf: 23 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: John Searle's Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism. aug: au: Sepetyi, Dmytro affil: Zaporizhzhia State Medical University su: Dualism Naturalism Materialism Searle, John R., 1932-2025 Self Consciousness sug: subj: Dualism Naturalism Materialism Searle, John R., 1932-2025 Self Consciousness keyword: dualism epiphenomenalism materialism naturalism ab: The article discusses the relationship between John Searle's doctrine of naturalism and various forms of materialism and dualism. It is argued that despite Searle's protestations, his doctrine is not substantially different from the epiphenomenalistic property dualism, except for the admission, in his later works, of the existence of an irreducible non-Humean self. In particular, his recognition that consciousness is unique in having an irreducible first-person ontology makes his disavowal of property dualism purely verbalistic. As for epiphenomenalism, Searle's explanation of how consciousness can be efficacious without violating the causal closure of the physical, by analogy with the causal efficacy of the higher level properties of physical objects that are supervenient on the microphysical, confuses causality and constitution (causal and constitutive supervenience). It is also argued that Searle's recognition of the existence of an irreducible non-Humean self that is responsible for decision-making sits badly both with his (property dualistic) view that conscious mental states are irreducibly first-personal states of the brain (rather than of the self) and with his (epiphenomenalistic) view that consciousness has no causal power in addition to that of the underlying neurobiology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Paradigm Publishing Services and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy holder: Paradigm Publishing Services dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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