What's wrong with truth-conditional accounts of slurs.

The aim of this paper is to provide arguments based on linguistic evidence that discard a truth-conditional analysis of slurs (TCA) and pave the way for more promising approaches. We consider Hom and May's version of TCA, according to which the derogatory content of slurs is part of their truth-cond...

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Publicado en:Linguistics & Philosophy Vol. 42; no. 4; pp. 333 - 348
Autores principales: Cepollaro, Bianca, Thommen, Tristan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: What's wrong with truth-conditional accounts of slurs.
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          Cepollaro, Bianca
          Thommen, Tristan
        affil:
          Università Vita Salute San Raffaele, Via Olgettina 58, 20132, Milan, Italy
          Institut Jean Nicod (IJN), École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, 29 rue d'Ulm, 75005, Paris, France
      su:
        Discriminatory language
        Semantics
        Language awareness
        Orators
        Language exams
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        subj:
          Discriminatory language
          Semantics
          Language awareness
          Orators
          Language exams
      keyword:
        Expressives
        Fictional slurs
        Metalinguistic negation
        Projection
        Slurs
        Truth-conditional account
      ab: The aim of this paper is to provide arguments based on linguistic evidence that discard a truth-conditional analysis of slurs (TCA) and pave the way for more promising approaches. We consider Hom and May's version of TCA, according to which the derogatory content of slurs is part of their truth-conditional meaning such that, when slurs are embedded under semantic operators such as negation, there is no derogatory content that projects out of the embedding. In order to support this view, Hom and May make two moves: (1) they point to cases where it looks like projection does not occur and (2) they try to explain away cases where projection seems to occur by appealing to a pragmatic phenomenon that they call 'offense'. Pace Hom and May, we argue that the derogatory content of slurs does in fact project and, in advocating for our claim, (1) we show that those cases where it looks like projection does not occur are in fact metalinguistic uses in which slurs are not really used, by relying on three linguistic tests (Sect. 3); and (2) we refute Hom and May's attempt to explain why speakers would entertain the supposedly wrong intuition that the derogatory content of slurs projects out of semantic embedding, by focusing on the case of slurs for fictional entities (Sect. 4). We conclude that Hom and May's strategies to support TCA ultimately fail.
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    language: English
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