Roles and relationships: On whether social roles ground associative reasons.
A common theory of associative reasons is that they attach to a social role, and when an individual identifies with that role, she acquires the attached reasons. I argue that associative reasons are different in kind from those provided by social roles. Social roles are self‐referential rather than...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27; no. 2; pp. 377 - 387 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=137436622&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 137436622 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2019 vid: 27 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 137436622 10.1111/ejop.12401 ppf: 377 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 300KB tig: atl: Roles and relationships: On whether social roles ground associative reasons. aug: au: Brewer‐Davis, Nina affil: Philosophy Department, Dominican University, River Forest Illinois, USA su: Social role Social belonging Psychology Social participation Interpersonal relations sug: subj: Social role Social belonging Psychology Social participation Interpersonal relations ab: A common theory of associative reasons is that they attach to a social role, and when an individual identifies with that role, she acquires the attached reasons. I argue that associative reasons are different in kind from those provided by social roles. Social roles are self‐referential rather than interpersonal. That is, role reasons apply to someone depending on whether or how the individual inhabits her role, rather than whether or how she participates in a relationship with another individual. A justification of associative reasons should start from a theory of relationships' normative significance, such as its shared history. Finally, I give a brief account of the normative significance of shared history, psychological connectedness. Shared history matters in virtue of the connectedness it produces between people. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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