Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies.
The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale's (Philos Sci 66(2):175–207, 1999) illuminating discussion of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this renewed interest. Among other virt...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 196; no. 8; pp. 3337 - 3354 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=137558407&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 137558407 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2019 vid: 196 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 137558407 10.1007/s11229-017-1599-1 ppf: 3337 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 449KB tig: atl: Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies. aug: au: Zerilli, John affil: School of Philosophy Coombs Building 9, Australian National University, 0200, Canberra, ACT, Australia su: Autonomy (Psychology) Taxonomy Intuition Grain sug: subj: Autonomy (Psychology) Taxonomy Intuition Grain keyword: Autonomy of psychology Bechtel and Mundale Intertheoretic reduction Multiple realization Neuroscience ab: The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale's (Philos Sci 66(2):175–207, 1999) illuminating discussion of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses what seems to be an important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims alleging the multiple realization of psychological kinds are vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, intuitions notwithstanding, the terms of their recommendation make it impossible to follow, while also misleadingly insinuating that its application virtually guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching of grains, what multiple realization really requires is a principled method for adjudicating upon differences between tokens. Shapiro's (J Philos 97(12):635–654, 2000) work on multiple realization can be understood as an attempt to adumbrate just such a method. While his "causal relevance" criterion can easily be mistaken for Bechtel and Mundale's grain requirement, my analysis reveals exactly where and why these two tests diverge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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