Where are virtues?
This paper argues that the question, 'where are virtues?' demands a response from virtue theorists. Despite the polarizing nature of debates about the relevance of empirical work in psychology for virtue theory, I first show that there is widespread agreement about the underlying structure of virtue...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 176; no. 9; pp. 2331 - 2350 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Sep2019
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=137664138&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 137664138 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2019 vid: 176 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 137664138 10.1007/s11098-018-1128-1 ppf: 2331 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 448KB tig: atl: Where are virtues? aug: au: Skorburg, Joshua August affil: Department of Philosophy, Duke University, 201. W. Duke Bldg., 27708, Durham, NC, USA su: Virtues Moral psychology Psychology Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Cognitive science sug: subj: Virtues Moral psychology Psychology Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Cognitive science keyword: Extended mind Virtue theory ab: This paper argues that the question, 'where are virtues?' demands a response from virtue theorists. Despite the polarizing nature of debates about the relevance of empirical work in psychology for virtue theory, I first show that there is widespread agreement about the underlying structure of virtue. Namely, that virtues are comprised of cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show that there are well-developed arguments that cognitive processes can extend beyond the agent. Then, I show that there are similarly well-developed arguments that affective processes can extend beyond the agent. I then introduce three cases to establish that these cognitive and affective processes are relevantly similar to the cognitive and affective processes countenanced by plausible theories of virtue. Finally, I conclude that virtue theorists must abandon default internalism, the (often implicit) view that the cognitive and affective processes comprising virtues are internal to the agent. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|