Hume on the social construction of mathematical knowledge.
Mathematics for Hume is the exemplary field of demonstrative knowledge. Ideally, this knowledge is a priori as it arises only from the comparison of ideas without any further empirical input; it is certain because demonstration consist of steps that are intuitively evident and infallible; and it is...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 196; no. 9; pp. 3615 - 3632 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=137684529&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 137684529 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2019 vid: 196 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 137684529 10.1007/s11229-017-1655-x ppf: 3615 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 386KB tig: atl: Hume on the social construction of mathematical knowledge. aug: au: Demeter, Tamás affil: Institute of Philosophy, RCH, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary Department of Sociology, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary su: Human behavior Sociability Modularity (Psychology) Metaphysics Certainty sug: subj: Human behavior Sociability Modularity (Psychology) Metaphysics Certainty keyword: Demonstrative reasoning Faculties Mathematical practice Metaphysics of knowledge Sceptical solution Scepticism Sympathy ab: Mathematics for Hume is the exemplary field of demonstrative knowledge. Ideally, this knowledge is a priori as it arises only from the comparison of ideas without any further empirical input; it is certain because demonstration consist of steps that are intuitively evident and infallible; and it is also necessary because the possibility of its falsity is inconceivable as it would imply a contradiction. But this is only the ideal, because demonstrative sciences are human enterprises and as such they are just as fallible as their human practitioners. According to the reading suggested here, Hume develops a radical sceptical challenge for mathematics, and thereby he undermines the knowledge claims associated with demonstrative reasoning. But Hume does not stop there: he also offers resources for a sceptical solution to this challenge, one that appeals crucially to social practices, and sketches the social genealogy of a community-wide mathematical certainty. While explaining this process, he relies on the conceptual resources of his faculty psychology that helps him to distinguish between the metaphysics and practices of mathematical knowledge. His account explains why we have reasons to be dubious about our reasoning capacities, and also how human nature and sociability offers some remedy from these epistemic adversities. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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