Why Organ Conscription Should Be off the Table: Extrapolation from Heidegger's Being and Time.

The question, what measures to address the shortage of transplantable organs are ethically permissible? requires careful attention because, apart from its impact on medical practice, the stance we espouse here reflects our interpretations of human freedom and mortality. To raise the number of availa...

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Publicado en:Sophia Vol. 58; no. 2; pp. 153 - 175
Autor principal: Levin, Susan B.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2019
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Why Organ Conscription Should Be off the Table: Extrapolation from Heidegger's Being and Time.
      aug:
        au: Levin, Susan B.
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Smith College, Dewey Hall, 4 Neilson Drive, 01063, Northampton, MA, USA
      su:
        Extrapolation
        Mortality
        Ontology
        Medical practice
        Kantian ethics
        Deontological ethics
      sug:
        subj:
          Extrapolation
          Mortality
          Ontology
          Medical practice
          Kantian ethics
          Deontological ethics
      keyword:
        Being and Time
        Freedom
        Heidegger
        Organ conscription
        Organ procurement
      ab: The question, what measures to address the shortage of transplantable organs are ethically permissible? requires careful attention because, apart from its impact on medical practice, the stance we espouse here reflects our interpretations of human freedom and mortality. To raise the number of available organs, on utilitarian grounds, bioethicists and medical professionals increasingly support mandatory procurement. This view is at odds with the Catechism of the Catholic Church (2003, p. 2296), according to which '[o]rgan donation after death is a noble and meritorious act' but ethically impermissible absent consent. Those who concur with this position, but would oppose conscription on independent philosophical grounds, have not yet found a voice in the Western tradition comparable in strength to the utilitarian basis of the policy's support, for Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, too, lend themselves to a requirement that we make our organs available to others when they can no longer serve ourselves. One finds an ethical wedge against conscription in an unexpected philosophical locale: the 'fundamental ontology' of Heidegger's Being and Time, where pertinent individual choices arc protectively over what happens post mortem. Heidegger's perspective on this issue thus meshes, not with other philosophical voices, but with Catholic doctrine—a surprising convergence of atheistic and theistic approaches to our flourishing whose ground I address in the article's conclusion.
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