Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence.
This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works...
| Publicado en: | Public Administration Review Vol. 79; no. 4; pp. 538 - 552 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul/Aug2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=137944325&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 137944325 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00333352 PBA jtl: Public Administration Review issn: 00333352 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul/Aug2019 vid: 79 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 137944325 10.1111/puar.13007 ppf: 538 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 472KB tig: atl: Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence. aug: au: Ni, Xing Su (Su Su), Xuhong affil: Wuhan University University of South Carolina su: Corruption Bribery Institutional theory (Sociology) Whistleblowing Citizen attitudes Deterrence (Administrative law) sug: subj: Corruption Bribery Institutional theory (Sociology) Whistleblowing Citizen attitudes Deterrence (Administrative law) ab: This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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