How Payment for Research Participation Can Be Coercive.
The idea that payment for research participation can be coercive appears widespread among research ethics committee members, researchers, and regulatory bodies. Yet analysis of the concept of coercion by philosophers and bioethicists has mostly concluded that payment does not coerce, because coercio...
| Publicado en: | American Journal of Bioethics Vol. 19; no. 9; pp. 21 - 32 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Publicado: |
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ccm&AN=138105546&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ccm uiTerm: 138105546 longDbName: CINAHL Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: dissinfo: jinfo: jid: 15265161 FKZ jtl: American Journal of Bioethics issn: 15265161 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2019 vid: 19 iid: 9 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd place: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania artinfo: ui: 138105546 10.1080/15265161.2019.1630497 138105546 ppf: 21 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P tig: atl: How Payment for Research Participation Can Be Coercive. aug: au: Millum, Joseph Garnett, Michael affil: National Institutes of Health sug: subj: Coercion Research Subjects Research Ethics Consent (Research) Bioethics Researcher-Subject Relations Rate Setting and Review Fees and Charges Contracts ab: The idea that payment for research participation can be coercive appears widespread among research ethics committee members, researchers, and regulatory bodies. Yet analysis of the concept of coercion by philosophers and bioethicists has mostly concluded that payment does not coerce, because coercion necessarily involves threats, not offers. In this article we aim to resolve this disagreement by distinguishing between two distinct but overlapping concepts of coercion. Consent-undermining coercion marks out certain actions as impermissible and certain agreements as unenforceable. By contrast, coercion as subjection indicates a way in which someone's interests can be partially set back in virtue of being subject to another's foreign will. While offers of payment do not normally constitute consent-undermining coercion, they do sometimes constitute coercion as subjection. We offer an analysis of coercion as subjection and propose three possible practical responses to worries about the coerciveness of payment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Journal Article ougenre: Article language: English refInfo: holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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