Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy.
On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of 'value definiteness', according to which the properties ('observables') of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether two recent approaches to metap...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 176; no. 10; pp. 2599 - 2628 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=138170858&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 138170858 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2019 vid: 176 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 138170858 10.1007/s11098-018-1143-2 ppf: 2599 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 482KB tig: atl: Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. aug: au: Calosi, Claudio Wilson, Jessica affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada su: Indeterminism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Philosophy Determinism (Philosophy) Quantum theory sug: subj: Indeterminism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Philosophy Determinism (Philosophy) Quantum theory keyword: Determinable-based metaphysical indeterminacy Metaphysical indeterminacy Metaphysical supervaluationism Quantum indeterminacy Quantum mechanics ab: On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of 'value definiteness', according to which the properties ('observables') of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether two recent approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy—a metaphysical supervaluationist account, on the one hand, and a determinable-based account, on the other—can provide an intelligible basis for quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI), understood as involving quantum value indefiniteness. After identifying three sources of such QMI, we show that previous arguments (Darby in Australas J Philos 88:227–245, 2010; Skow in Philos Q 60:851–858, 2010) according to which supervaluationism cannot accommodate QMI are unsuccessful; we then provide more comprehensive arguments for this conclusion, which moreover establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the orthodox interpretation. We go on to argue that a determinable-based approach can accommodate the full range of sources of QMI. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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