Non-existent Things as Subject of Inference in Bhāviveka's Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun.
This paper is a preliminary study of Bhāviveka's Svātantrika-Mādhyamika justifications for taking non-existent things as the subject (pakṣa) of an inference, based on his Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun (*Karatalaratna). Bhāviveka's treatment of inference is similar to that of Dignāga in that the subject is r...
| Published in: | Journal of Indian Philosophy Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 795 - 811 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Sep2019
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=138227803&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 138227803 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00221791 OI3 jtl: Journal of Indian Philosophy issn: 00221791 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2019 vid: 47 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 138227803 10.1007/s10781-019-09404-2 ppf: 795 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 456KB tig: atl: Non-existent Things as Subject of Inference in Bhāviveka's Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun. aug: au: Fong, Lai Yan affil: Hong Kong, China su: Bh̄avaviveka Nāgārjuna, fl. 2nd century Mahayana Buddhism Truth Buddhists sug: subj: Bh̄avaviveka Nāgārjuna, fl. 2nd century Mahayana Buddhism Truth Buddhists keyword: *Karatalaratna Bhāviveka Conventional truth Emptiness Karatalaratna Madhyamaka pakṣa parārthānumāna Unconditioned things ab: This paper is a preliminary study of Bhāviveka's Svātantrika-Mādhyamika justifications for taking non-existent things as the subject (pakṣa) of an inference, based on his Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun (*Karatalaratna). Bhāviveka's treatment of inference is similar to that of Dignāga in that the subject is required to be existent. Bhāviveka also holds that, in a conventional sense, words refer to universals and to the existent entities that possess them, while the two are cognised together. However, in his inference for the unreality of unconditioned things, he likens these things (the subject) to a sky-flower (the example, dṛṣṭānta) that never arises and is unreal even conventionally. This paper first demonstrates how taking unconditioned things (being non-existent) as the subject of an inference can be problematic for Bhāviveka. Then, it discusses Bhāviveka's attempts to address the problems by subsuming the unconditioned things under the domain of conventional reality. The paper concludes that these attempts show his flexibility in terms of what is taken as conventionally real. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Indian Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Indian Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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