NEGOTIATING WATER ON UNEQUAL TERMS: CATTLE LOANS, DEPENDENCIES AND POWER IN COMMUNAL WATER MANAGEMENT IN NORTHWEST NAMIBIA.
This article shows how the distribution of costs for communal boreholes in the Kunene region of northwest Namibia is largely shaped by patron-client relationships based on cattle loans among pastoralists. Drawing on a case study in the context of state water decentralisation reforms, the paper argue...
| Published in: | Nomadic Peoples Vol. 23; no. 2; pp. 241 - 261 |
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| Format: | Article |
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White Horse Press
2019
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=138600619&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 138600619 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 08227942 9GK jtl: Nomadic Peoples issn: 08227942 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2019 vid: 23 iid: 2 pid: 12888 pub: White Horse Press artinfo: ui: 138600619 10.3197/np.2019.230205 ppf: 241 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 3.4MB tig: atl: NEGOTIATING WATER ON UNEQUAL TERMS: CATTLE LOANS, DEPENDENCIES AND POWER IN COMMUNAL WATER MANAGEMENT IN NORTHWEST NAMIBIA. aug: au: Schwieger, Diego A. Menestrey affil: Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Cologne su: Namibia Patronage Water management Boreholes Bargaining power sug: subj: Patronage Namibia Water management Boreholes Bargaining power keyword: livelihood security pastoralism social institutions livelihood security pastoralism social institutions ab: This article shows how the distribution of costs for communal boreholes in the Kunene region of northwest Namibia is largely shaped by patron-client relationships based on cattle loans among pastoralists. Drawing on a case study in the context of state water decentralisation reforms, the paper argues that, while cattle loans provide livelihood security for poor Himba herders, they also limit their bargaining power with regards to negotiating local contribution rules for the communal water point. Poorer heads of household find it difficult to negotiate on equal terms with their wealthy counterparts because they depend on their cattle transfers to make a living. As a result, contribution rules disadvantaging the poor are put into practice, leading to tensions between herders and putting pressure on social relations of support. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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