Minimum Wage Competition between Local Governments in China.
The theory of fiscal and regulatory competition between jurisdictions is more advanced than its empirical testing. This is particularly true of labour regulation in general, and minimum wage regulation in particular, and especially so for developing countries. This paper utilises the spatial lag met...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Development Studies Vol. 55; no. 12; pp. 2479 - 2495 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=138615571&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 138615571 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220388 JDS jtl: Journal of Development Studies issn: 00220388 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2019 vid: 55 iid: 12 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 138615571 10.1080/00220388.2018.1536263 ppf: 2479 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 138615571 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 138615571 tig: atl: Minimum Wage Competition between Local Governments in China. aug: au: Li, Yanan Kanbur, Ravi Lin, Carl affil: Department of Economics, Business School, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA Department of Economics, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA China Institute for Income Distribution, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China su: China Minimum wage Local government Government websites Panel analysis Wage decreases sug: subj: Minimum wage Local government China Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection of Miscellaneous Commercial Sectors Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals Government websites Panel analysis Wage decreases ab: The theory of fiscal and regulatory competition between jurisdictions is more advanced than its empirical testing. This is particularly true of labour regulation in general, and minimum wage regulation in particular, and especially so for developing countries. This paper utilises the spatial lag methodology to study city-level strategic interactions in setting and enforcing minimum wage standards during 2004–2012 in China. We manually collect a panel data set of city-level minimum wage standards from China's government websites. This analysis finds strong evidence of spatial interdependence in minimum wage standards and enforcement among main cities in China. If other cities decrease minimum wage standards by 1 RMB, the host city will decrease its standard by about 0.7–3.2 RMB. If the violation rate in other cities increases by 1 per cent, the host city will respond by an increase of roughly 0.4–1.0 percentage points. The results are robust to using three estimation methods, Maximum Likelihood, IV/GMM, and a dynamic panel data model. Our findings of strategic interactions suggest the need for policy coordination in labour regulation in China. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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