A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress.

This article develops and defends a new functional approach to scientific progress. I begin with a review of the problems of the traditional functional approach. Then I propose a new functional account of scientific progress, in which scientific progress is defined in terms of usefulness of problem...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 86; no. 4; pp. 739 - 759
Autor principal: Shan, Yafeng
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Oct2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        History of accounting
        Progress
        Problem solving
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          History of accounting
          Progress
          Problem solving
      ab: This article develops and defends a new functional approach to scientific progress. I begin with a review of the problems of the traditional functional approach. Then I propose a new functional account of scientific progress, in which scientific progress is defined in terms of usefulness of problem defining and problem solving. I illustrate and defend my account by applying it to the history of genetics. Finally, I highlight the advantages of my new functional approach over the epistemic and semantic approaches and dismiss some potential objections to my approach.
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