Truth in the Investigations.

According to a widespread interpretation, in the Investigations Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary or redundancy theory of truth. On this view, Wittgenstein's pronouncements about truth should be understood in the light of his invocation of the equivalences 'p' is true = p and 'p' is false = not p....

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 196; no. 10; pp. 4091 - 4112
Autor principal: Bartunek, Nicoletta
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Oct2019
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Bartunek, Nicoletta
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        Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
        Deflationary theory of truth
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          Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
          Deflationary theory of truth
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        Bipolarity
        Philosophical investigations
        Redundancy theory of truth
        Wittgenstein
      ab: According to a widespread interpretation, in the Investigations Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary or redundancy theory of truth. On this view, Wittgenstein's pronouncements about truth should be understood in the light of his invocation of the equivalences 'p' is true = p and 'p' is false = not p. This paper shows that this interpretation does not do justice to Wittgenstein's thoughts. I will be claiming that, in fact, in his second book Wittgenstein is returning to the pre-Tractarian notion of bipolarity, and that his new development of this notion in the Investigations excludes the redundancy-deflationary reading. Wittgenstein's thoughts about truth are instead compatible with another interpretative option: Wittgenstein remains faithful to his methodological pronouncements, and he merely presents us with (grammatical) platitudes about the notions of "true" and "false".
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