Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS.
Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher‐order awareness of her own mental states, and i...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 29; no. 1; pp. 241 - 254 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=139080615&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 139080615 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2019 vid: 29 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 139080615 10.1111/phis.12151 ppf: 241 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 224KB tig: atl: Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS. aug: au: Shieber, Joseph affil: Lafayette College su: Theory of knowledge Sosa, Ernest, 1940- Animal psychology Coherence (Philosophy) Cognition sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Sosa, Ernest, 1940- Animal psychology Coherence (Philosophy) Cognition ab: Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher‐order awareness of her own mental states, and is structured by relations of coherence. Although Sosa's distinction is extremely appealing, it also faces serious problems. In particular, the sorts of processes that would be required for reflective knowledge, as Sosa understands it, are not processes that are instantiated in human cognition. I argue that the problems facing Sosa's notion of reflective knowledge stem from treating human cognitive processes individualistically. They stem from what I will term Sosa's perspective of methodologically individualistic noetic explanation—or MINE. I suggest that these problems disappear if we expand the scope of what counts as cognitive processes to include socially distributed cognitive processes, if we adopt a framework of other‐derived united reflective self‐evaluation—or OURS. In other words, I'll suggest that a solution to the problems facing the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge may be found in a shift of perspective from MINE to OURS. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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