Responsibility for Killer Robots.
Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not so...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 22; no. 3; pp. 731 - 748 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=139186804&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 139186804 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2019 vid: 22 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 139186804 10.1007/s10677-019-10007-9 ppf: 731 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 360KB tig: atl: Responsibility for Killer Robots. aug: au: Himmelreich, Johannes affil: McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society, Stanford University, 450 Serra Mall, 94305, Stanford, CA, USA su: Weapons Ethics Responsibility Artificial intelligence Governmental investigations sug: subj: Weapons Ethics Responsibility Artificial intelligence Governmental investigations keyword: Causation Hierarchical groups Moral philosophy Moral responsibility Responsibility gap ab: Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not sound. The argument assumes that commanders have no control over whether autonomous weapons inflict harm. I argue against this assumption. Although this investigation concerns a specific case of autonomous weapons systems, I take steps towards vindicating the more general idea that superiors can be morally responsible in virtue of being in command. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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