Why rights are not optimisation requirements.

In this article I pursue the implications of the statement that constitutional rights are – as Alexy's principles theory argues – optimisation requirements, and show that they are not. I argue that, applied to moral rights, optimisation obfuscates their nature, their relationship to human well-being...

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Publicado en:Jurisprudence Vol. 10; no. 3; pp. 354 - 375
Autor principal: Zanghellini, Aleardo
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2019
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Why rights are not optimisation requirements.
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        au: Zanghellini, Aleardo
        affil: School of Law, University of Reading, Reading, UK
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        Civil rights
        Deontological ethics
        Well-being
        Discretion
        Proportionality in law
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          Civil rights
          Deontological ethics
          Well-being
          Discretion
          Proportionality in law
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        Alexy
        optimisation
        principles theory
        proportionality
        rights
        Alexy
        optimisation
        principles theory
        proportionality
        rights
      ab: In this article I pursue the implications of the statement that constitutional rights are – as Alexy's principles theory argues – optimisation requirements, and show that they are not. I argue that, applied to moral rights, optimisation obfuscates their nature, their relationship to human well-being, and the work they do in practical thought. As to constitutional rights, the fact that they belong in an institutional framework suggests some reasons for treating them like optimisation requirements in circumscribed cases. But these reasons are far from conclusive; and treating rights like optimisation requirements in other scenarios (such as cases of structural discretion) indicates that optimisation, as defined in the principles theory, does not assist us in thinking well about the structure of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights demand compliance with whatever the interests on which they are based demand – whether or not what they demand is antecedently clear – not with some purported optimisation requirement.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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