Why rights are not optimisation requirements.
In this article I pursue the implications of the statement that constitutional rights are – as Alexy's principles theory argues – optimisation requirements, and show that they are not. I argue that, applied to moral rights, optimisation obfuscates their nature, their relationship to human well-being...
| Publicado en: | Jurisprudence Vol. 10; no. 3; pp. 354 - 375 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=139211556&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 139211556 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 20403313 BJHE jtl: Jurisprudence issn: 20403313 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2019 vid: 10 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 139211556 10.1080/20403313.2019.1629195 ppf: 354 ppct: 21 formats: tig: atl: Why rights are not optimisation requirements. aug: au: Zanghellini, Aleardo affil: School of Law, University of Reading, Reading, UK su: Civil rights Deontological ethics Well-being Discretion Proportionality in law sug: subj: Civil rights Deontological ethics Well-being Discretion Proportionality in law keyword: Alexy optimisation principles theory proportionality rights Alexy optimisation principles theory proportionality rights ab: In this article I pursue the implications of the statement that constitutional rights are – as Alexy's principles theory argues – optimisation requirements, and show that they are not. I argue that, applied to moral rights, optimisation obfuscates their nature, their relationship to human well-being, and the work they do in practical thought. As to constitutional rights, the fact that they belong in an institutional framework suggests some reasons for treating them like optimisation requirements in circumscribed cases. But these reasons are far from conclusive; and treating rights like optimisation requirements in other scenarios (such as cases of structural discretion) indicates that optimisation, as defined in the principles theory, does not assist us in thinking well about the structure of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights demand compliance with whatever the interests on which they are based demand – whether or not what they demand is antecedently clear – not with some purported optimisation requirement. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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