Simplicity and the Meaning of Mental Association.

Some thoughts just come to mind together. This is usually thought to happen because they are connected by associations, which the mind follows. Such an explanation assumes that there is a particular kind of simple psychological process responsible. This view has encountered criticism recently. In re...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 84; no. 6; pp. 1207 - 1229
Main Author: Dacey, Mike
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Dec2019
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        affil: Bates College, Hedge Hall, 7 Andrews Rd., 04240, Lewiston, ME, USA
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        Association of ideas
        Simplicity
        Psychology
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          Association of ideas
          Simplicity
          Psychology
      ab: Some thoughts just come to mind together. This is usually thought to happen because they are connected by associations, which the mind follows. Such an explanation assumes that there is a particular kind of simple psychological process responsible. This view has encountered criticism recently. In response, this paper aims to characterize a general understanding of associative simplicity, which might support the distinction between associative processing and alternatives. I argue that there are two kinds of simplicity that are treated as characteristic of association, and as a result three possible versions of associative processing. This provides a framework that informs our understanding of association as a current and historical concept, including how various specific versions in different parts of psychology relate to one another. This framework can also guide debates over normative evaluations of actions produced by processes thought to be associative.
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    language: English
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