Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice.
While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may...
| Published in: | Economic Journal Vol. 129; no. 623; pp. 2779 - 2805 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=139681015&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 139681015 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00130133 EJN jtl: Economic Journal issn: 00130133 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2019 vid: 129 iid: 623 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 139681015 10.1093/ej/uez024 ppf: 2779 ppct: 26 formats: tig: atl: Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice. aug: au: Ding, Tingting Schotter, Andrew affil: School of Economics, Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Department of Economics, Center for Experimental Social Science, New York University su: Social learning Social sciences Social networks Programming software Algorithms sug: subj: Social learning Social sciences Social networks Other Individual and Family Services Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities Programming software Algorithms ab: While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms—even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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